Today's coverage of the Snowden dilemma outlines calls attention to a major source of technological failure, in short, the failure to classify effectively. The question has not been raised, at least not emphasized, since the young man in question called attention to himself by jumping ship on the US intelligence community. The question is this: How is it that a young, fairly junior technician was able to gain access to the treasure trove of data that he has laid claim to? What credentials allowed him to access such information? Was such a breathtaking act of confidence in this person justified in the first place? Was it necessary?
Not much has been disclosed as to his policy credentials. He did not graduate from a foreign policy program. He was not coached in the nuances of international diplomacy. His views were not tested nor was his understanding of important public and private issues and laws appropriately established. From what is known, we understand that he was brought into his privileged position based on technical credentials. He has been referred to as a hacker. Similarly, he is referred to as an analyst, having called himself a "technical wizard". He has a questionable academic history, where it looks like he misrepresented himself, at least according to his Wikipedia description.
Even assuming his background was as he originally indicated, isn't allowing someone with strictly technical credentials such access kin to providing a plumber to access to marriage counselling records or looking to that person for family financial guidance? What would there be in the training or preparation of a technician of this kind that to justify handling him such a treasure trove of sensitive information?
The rationale is likely a technical one. He understood "pipes" or what Castells refers to as "switches", the "privileged instruments of power" in a networked world. Such information is stored largely in documents, which are conveniently stored in file systems on the computers in question. To have access to such information someone simply needs to be able to get the directories and data types in question. Making sense of the contents of the documents is trivial. It is assumed that dangling such organized information, however sensitive, in reach of technicians, is a necessary evil. Somebody has to do it, so it is perhaps better to hire individuals with arcane knowledge of the labyrinths that are computers so that they will be "on your side" in the battle. The needed skill set to navigate the "dark alleys" is skewed toward the young, who have the time and the orientation to become hackers if not video game champions. It is thus important to give them access to all the keys, given their ability to probably take them on their own anyway.
The result is an awkward public spectacle, one that is possibly achieving one of his objectives in raising concerns for individual privacy and government legitimacy, but not necessarily in useful ways. The implications of international diplomacy and the concerns for individual privacy do intersect to some degree, but not necessarily in ways that Mr. Snowden and his supporters and compatriots imply or understand. There may be people engaged in international business activities that wander into communications with questionable parties from a national security standpoint, but it is doubtful that most of us do. The implication that most citizens are subject to investigation is disingenuous, absent some proof. Were Eric Snowden to want to make strong claims as to such indiscretions, he should have provided evidence of them. In this way, he could have teamed up with the injured parties to make the case for government wrongdoing. Powerful parties who had been injured in this way would be very useful allies; regular citizens similarly wronged may have been even more helpful in making the point. What we are left with, given Mr. Snowden's awkward flight, is a vague collection of ghosts and goblins of indefinite shape and magnitude. If peoples' rights, if not their interests, were harmed, how was it done; how could such conditions be avoided in the future? This is a critical domestic policy issue that is not necessarily aided by Mr. Snowden, if that was his goal in the first place.
The problem comes at a critical time with regard to the enormous flow of data and the issue of legitimate stewardship of it, whether by public or private institutions. In the face of this, one thing is certain: there is no going back. Given the benefits and enjoyments from big data in many respects, there is little call for a "no data" future, though there are many that have opted to minimize their online footprint. The phenomenon is not going to go away by any count; we simply need to learn how to do it better.
I once was told by a friend, a system, administrator, that there was no such thing as a secure system, that such a system was a "pipe dream". He indicated that if a typical hacker was to go after a system, there was no way that that person was going to fail. I agreed with him that there was no way that a system couldn't be "taken down" by denial of service. On the other hand, I said that a system with strong encryption, with good password management, with one open port (typically for web access) would be very difficult to compromise. He responded with, "What would be the fun in that? You couldn't do that because users demand applications that would make it impossible".
Hidden in the response is kind of a backhanded acknowledgement that such a system could be safe from intrusion. The point is that with each open port, systems become more like sieves; with each user login at the system level and "sandbox", the chances of a system breech are magnified. Thus, there are ways of substantially reducing the risk that are not widely deployed.
There is another issue, the way data is stored and managed. The document-centric approach as underscores the Snowden case is an "epistemological nightmare". By this, I mean that it provides sensitive information in contexts that "give away the store" to anyone with the time and inclination to read them. Storing such information in documents of this kind, and providing open access to them, is a crude and sloppy way of managing any information, let alone sensitive information with regard to privacy or secrecy..
Data should be stored in ways that keep intruders out, similar to what I described earlier with regard to systems. Lock up the database; encrypt the stack (or what would be typically called database tables). Only allow access to users with specific rights to see data in context -- as defined by analysts, experts, and authorities in the fields in question. Only provide access to people which legitimate credentials in the cases in question under controlled conditions. Make such authorization requirements multilevel in nature, requiring both authoritative and cognitive gateways, then only to specific, linked information. In such an environment, technologists could have access to the "pipes" to make sure the systems were working, but they could not see the data in either raw form or in terms of documents. Information and the contexts of that information would only be available on a "need to know" basis -- ever. Such conditions themselves could be managed using classification tools. By classification, I mean the "if p, then q" model of Aristotle, the universal classification structure. This can be done in what I refer to as "expressive" classification structures, or trees.
Thus, the Eric Snowden's of the world -- and any other technologists or others with incidental access to data -- would have no choice to disclose information that they had no right to from a cognitive or authoritative standpoint. They would be managing "pipes", not "switches", with no knowledge of what was passing through the secure conduits. Access to any and all data and its meaningful contexts would only be available as it was earned in the community of practice in question, which would control the expressive trees that would grant such access. Certainly, there would continue to be documents flowing throughout the network, but the sensitive ones would be far less likely to be stolen, certainly not in volume as is possible when they are stashed in directories or folders as is typically the case.
In such a regime, there could be breeches, but they would be much more limited in terms of scope and subject area. No one would be able to serve up the entire store of information, except in encrypted, unclassified forms that would be unintelligible. Under such a system, junior technicians could not take upon themselves outsized influence, wielding "instruments of power" beyond their comprehension. They could conceivable break ranks with their employers, but they would simply be out of a job.
In such an environment, how would our rights be protected? This would be a critical aspect of the aforementioned "switches". They would need to be controlled by the "communities of practice", the legitimate authorities and networks of people and organizations that earn our trust and their respective professional respect and standing. Such designations have social and political implications, as well as commercial aspects. Trust is the important factor, trust that must be earned, having been tested and found worthy. The Eric Snowdens are a bad bet in the first place.
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